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a b s t r a c t
Building on Arad and Rubinstein (2013), we introduce tournaments as simultaneous n-player games
based on an m-player game g . A player meets each group of m − 1 opponents m! times to play g in
alternating roles. The winner of the tournament is the player who attains the highest accumulated
score. We explore the relationship between the equilibria of the tournament and the equilibria of the
game g and confirm that tournaments provide a refinement criterion. We compare it with standard
refinements in the literature and show that it is satisfied by strict equilibria. We use our tournament
model to study a selection of relevant economic applications, including risk-taking behavior.
© 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The two-player game
has the unique Nash equilibrium (A, C). Suppose that two players
play this game twice, simultaneously, and in alternating roles,
with the objective of maximizing the sum of the payoffs they get
in both matches. That is, they play the symmetric game
If they both play AC – i.e. A when in the role of player 1 and
C when in the role of player 2 – they both get a payoff of 11.
None of them has an incentive to deviate, since any other choice
leads to a lower payoff, and both players playing AC is the unique
equilibrium of such a game.1
Consider the same situation with the difference that the num-
bers that represented payoffs are now just scores, a prize is
✩ A preliminary analysis of the case in which the base game is a two-player
game is contained in the working paper ‘‘Double round-robin tournaments’’
(UNSW Business School Research Paper No. 2016 ECON 04).∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: francesco.desinopoli@univr.it (F. De Sinopoli),
claudia.meroni@univr.it (C. Meroni), c.pimienta@unsw.edu.au (C. Pimienta).
1 In fact, it is the only strategy that survives iterated deletion of strictly
dominated strategies.
awarded to the player with the highest total score, and players
want to maximize the probability of winning the prize. In the
event of a tie, each player is the winner with probability 1/2.
In this case (AC, AC) is no longer an equilibrium.2 Indeed, each
player has an incentive to deviate, for instance, to BC . In doing
so, the deviator loses two points but also lowers her opponent’s
payoff by five points, thus winning the prize with probability 1. It
is easy to see that the unique equilibrium of this game is (BD, BD)
and that both players win with probability 1/2.3
We can think of the same competitive situation extended to
any number n of players, where everyone meets all her opponents
twice to play the same two-player game in alternating roles
and where the prize is awarded to the player with the highest
accumulated score. We call such a competition ‘‘double round-
robin tournament’’. Furthermore, we can extend this competition
model to any possible m-player base game, so that each player
plays g with every possible group of m − 1 opponents m! times,
each time in a different permutation of the m roles. We call
such a competition ‘‘m-tuple round-robin tournament’’, or simply
‘‘tournament’’.
2 Note that, with this notation, we list a strategy for each player that indicates
first what she chooses when in the role of player 1 and then what she chooses
when in the role of player 2. For instance, the profile (AC, BD) represents the
case in which in one match (A,D) is played and in the other (B, C) is played.
3 Note that the original game is transformed into the following 4 × 4
constant sum game:
AC AD BC BD
AC 1/2, 1/2 1/2, 1/2 0, 1 0, 1
AD 1/2, 1/2 1/2, 1/2 0, 1 0, 1
BC 1, 0 1, 0 1/2, 1/2 0, 1
BD 1, 0 1, 0 1, 0 1/2, 1/2
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2019.11.003
0304-4068/© 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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This construction is based on round-robin tournaments as in-
troduced by Arad and Rubinstein (2013) (henceforth, AR13). An
n-player round-robin tournament R(g, n) is a simultaneous game
in which every player is matched with each one of her n − 1
opponents once to play the two-player symmetric game g . AR13
assume that each player uses the same action every time she
meets a new opponent. In turn, we define an m-tuple round-robin
tournament (or simply tournament) T (g, n) as a simultaneous
n-player game in which every player is matched with each group
of m − 1 opponents m! times and, in every match, a (possibly
asymmetric) m-player game g is played, where m ≤ n. In the
m! matches of the same group of players, they play g in all the
possible permutations of the m roles. We assume that each player
always uses the same action in all the matches that she plays
in a given role, independently of the set of opponents of any
given match and the roles in which they play. The winner of
the tournament is the player with the highest accumulated score,
which is given by the sum of the scores that she obtains in all
the matches she plays. Players care only about maximizing the
probability of being the highest scorer in the tournament and not
about maximizing the total score.4
Like with the opening example, throughout our analysis we of-
ten consider the simplest case in which g is a two-player game. To
this end we also define a double round-robin tournament D(g, n)
as an n-player tournament based on a (possibly asymmetric) two-
player game g . A player plays g twice with each opponent, once
in the role of the first player and once in the role of the second
player of g . Using sports terminology, we say that a player plays
once ‘‘at home’’ and once ‘‘away’’. Thus, each player always uses
the same action in all the matches she plays at home and the
same action in all the matches she plays away.
We follow AR13 and use the symmetric Nash equilibrium as
solution concept, so that every player uses the same strategy
that specifies which action to play in each of the m roles.5 The
vector of actions that a player will ultimately play in each role is
the outcome of a randomization (mixed strategy) executed only
once and before starting the interactions within the tournament.
Consider again the initial example. Under the assumptions of our
model, the tournament with three players has a symmetric equi-
librium in which every player chooses B when playing at home
and D when playing away. For n ≥ 4, instead, the symmetric
Nash equilibrium of the tournament prescribes players to choose
A at home and C away, which are the Nash equilibrium strategies
of the original two-player game. As with AR13, this is not a
coincidence. As n grows, deviating from the equilibrium strategies
of the base game becomes less and less profitable. The potential
loss inflicted to each of the other players becomes negligible
compared to the score foregone by not playing a best response to
the strategy used by every other player in the tournament. The
consequence is that the limit as n goes to infinity of a sequence
of equilibria of T (g, n) must be a Nash equilibrium of g .
However, the opposite is not true. There may be equilibria
of the base game g that are not limit points of equilibria of
tournaments as the number of players grows to infinity. Thus,
4 In the example at the beginning we have seen that, when individuals want
to maximize the sum of the payoffs in the two matches, the unique equilibrium
prescribes the Nash equilibrium strategies of the base game. In general it is clear
that if players’ objective is to maximize the total accumulated score and players
employ the same action in all the matches they play in a given role then every
equilibrium of the base game is a symmetric equilibrium of the tournament and
vice versa. As discussed at the end of the introduction, see Laffond et al. (2000)
for an analysis of the case in which the base game is a symmetric two-player
game.
5 As we will see in Section 3, the use of symmetric Nash equilibrium is
necessary to properly relate equilibria of the tournament and equilibria of the
game on which it is built. In fact, a strategy of the tournament identifies a
strategy combination of the base game.
we study the conditions under which equilibria of g are an
appropriate approximation of equilibria of the tournament. In this
way, we extend to any m-player (and possibly asymmetric) game
g the criterion that selects a subset of Nash equilibria as ‘‘a stable
distribution of actions over a large population of individuals who
are occasionally matched to play g [. . . ] in environments where
individuals are interested in maximizing the chances of being the
best ’’ (AR13, p.33). We call these equilibria ‘‘tournament-stable’’.
The standard literature on equilibrium refinements has pro-
vided several solution concepts that restrict the set of Nash equi-
libria in order to satisfy rationality requirements, e.g. existence,
admissibility, iterated dominance, backward and forward induc-
tion (see van Damme, 1991 for a survey). We compare the cri-
terion provided by tournaments with some of these solution
concepts. We show that strict equilibria (i.e. Nash equilibria such
that, for every player, every deviation implies a strict loss) are
always tournament-stable. We then present two classic economic
applications, the ultimatum game and the entry game, in which
tournaments and prominent equilibrium refinements lead to dif-
ferent results. In the ultimatum game the set of tournament-
stable equilibria appears to be too restrictive, as it does not
contain the equilibrium in which the first player makes an unfair
proposal and the second player accepts it, which is a Kohlberg
and Mertens (1986) stable set as a singleton.6 However, in the
entry game, the concept of tournament-stable equilibrium proves
to be too weak, as it sustains all the dominated Nash equilibria
in which the potential entrant stays out of the market because
the incumbent is going to behave aggressively with some positive
probability.
AR13 list different interpretations of their tournament model.
We note that most of them can be extended to also motivate
our tournaments, with the additional advantage of being able
to study any asymmetric interaction. According to the straight-
forward interpretation, players can participate in a tournament
where changing action from match to match is costly enough
so that they have to use the same action in all the matches.
Double round-robin tournaments, for instance, are common in
several sports competitions, where each team plays against every
other team home and away. In such competitions, the coach,
players and tactics have to be decided before the season starts
and matches are typically asymmetric since the home team has
the home court advantage. According to the social interpretation,
agents can be occasionally involved in asymmetric interactions
and only care about being the best achiever. Often, they play
alternating roles in such interactions. For instance, they are both
buyers and sellers, give and make interviews, make or receive
the first offer when bargaining, etc. Finally, individuals can be
randomly matched to interact in a biological contest. This is typi-
cally asymmetric, since individuals differ in qualities such as size,
age, fighting ability, etc., which affect their relative probability
of winning an isolated contest as well as how much they have
to gain from it. The asymmetry can also be arbitrary and arise
from the fact that one of the contestants arrives at the resource
first and becomes the owner. Behavior can be conditioned on
such asymmetries and can be summarized by a strategy that
is genetically determined such as ‘‘if you are the owner of the
resource attack, if you are the intruder retreat’’ (Maynard Smith
and Parker, 1976). Evolution selects only the highest achieving
strategies and eliminates the rest.
As argued by AR13, the refinement criterion provided by tour-
naments may be more appropriate to such an evolutionary inter-
pretation of equilibrium. Indeed, every Evolutionary Stable Strat-
egy is robust to AR13’s tournament model. The fact that evolution
6 Loosely speaking, a Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) stable set is a minimal
subset of Nash equilibria that is robust against every possible strategy perturba-
tion; that is, every close-by game that can be generated through pure-strategy
perturbations has a Nash equilibrium close to the stable set.
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only selects the best performing strategies intuitively encourages
risky behavior. Similarly to AR13, we also study whether tour-
naments favor risky strategies. We do this using a novel and
very natural framework in which tournaments turn out to be an
extremely useful refinement criterion. We consider a two-player
game in which player 1 has to choose between a safe outside
option or entering a constant sum game against player 2, whose
Nash equilibrium payoff to player 1 coincides with that of the
outside option. We demonstrate that the tournament structure
incentivizes engaging in risk-taking behavior as, in the unique
tournament-stable equilibrium, player 1 chooses to play the con-
stant sum game with probability 1. We also show that this result
is exactly driven by tournament incentives. Indeed we show that
if players wanted to minimize the probability of being the lowest
scorers then in the unique tournament-stable equilibrium player
1 would always choose the safe outside option.
The applications of tournaments that we present consist of
games that have been traditionally studied by the experimen-
tal literature. In fact, AR13 (p.34) justify the tournament model
also in the context of experimental design. To study behavior
in the game g one may propose an experiment consisting of a
group of players who are re-matched after each interaction and
incentivized by the promise of a prize to the highest scorer. An
obvious caveat to this design is that it creates incentives that are
different from those present in g , as evidenced by the fact already
discussed that the set of equilibria of g and of the tournament can
be different. We emphasize that our model allows to extend such
a scope to all the possible games studied in experiments, which
are typically asymmetric.
Our work expands AR13’s analysis to every possible game and
to every possible equilibrium. In fact, not only can we study the
equilibria of non-trivial extensive form games, but also the non-
symmetric equilibria of symmetric games, which in many cases
are the more economically relevant equilibria.7 In particular, we
extend AR13’s analysis using a symmetrization of the game under
study.8 We relate strategy combinations (and equilibria) of the
base game with strategies (and symmetric equilibria) of such a
construction by proving an analogue of Kuhn’s theorem (Kuhn,
1953). This allows us to generalize AR13’s Proposition 1, which
establishes that every limit equilibrium of tournaments is an
equilibrium of the base game. Moreover, we present an exam-
ple which shows that there can be equilibria of a game that
are not limit equilibria of tournaments built on it, replicating
also AR13’s Proposition 2. Then, we discuss tournament-stability
as an equilibrium refinement with classical examples of extensive
form games in which the information structure is crucial. To
complete the comparison with AR13 we conclude analyzing some
two-player symmetric games, on which we can build both our
double round-robin tournaments and their round-robin tourna-
ments. The results obtained in the two cases show how AR13’s
conclusions do not extend immediately to our setting.
7 Think for instance of the ‘‘car-driving game’’
L R
L 0, 0 1, 1
R 1, 1 0, 0
where the only symmetric equilibrium is in mixed strategies, while the two
pure strategy equilibria in which the two drivers choose different lanes are
non-symmetric. Also, consider the ‘‘battle of the sexes’’, where again the unique
symmetric equilibrium is in mixed strategies, but it is Pareto dominated by
each of the two pure-strategy non-symmetric equilibria. It is unlikely that such
a symmetric equilibrium emerges from the stage of pre-play communication
and bargaining on which the theory of equilibrium is based and during which
players coordinate on one of the equilibria (of course, no agreement concluded
at that stage is enforceable).
8 In the initial example, it corresponds to the symmetric 4 × 4 game in
which payoffs are the sum of the payoffs in the two matches.
An alternative tournament model is considered by Laffond
et al. (2000). As in AR13 and in our model, each player chooses
one action and employs it in all her interactions. However, a
player’s payoff is given by the sum of the payoffs that she gets
in all the (symmetric) games she plays, so players do care about
their absolute total score. AR13 already explain the differences
between the tournament model and the classic model of con-
tests (see, e.g., Green and Stokey 1983, Dixit 1987, Konrad 2009;
among others), where players’ utilities depend on the probability
of winning, which is a function of players’ efforts, and on the
cost of their own effort. A particular contest model is that of
the elimination tournament, which consists of several rounds in
which individuals play pairwise matches (see, e.g., Rosen 1986,
Konrad 2004, Groh et al. 2012). Differently from our model, the
winner of a match advances to the next round of the tournament,
while the loser is eliminated from the competition.
We formally describe the model in the next section. In
Section 3, we analyze the interaction between any m players in
the tournament. We examine the relationship between equilibria
of the tournament and equilibria of the game on which it is built
in Section 4, and we compare the refinement criterion provided
by tournaments with standard refinements in Section 5. Section 6
explores risk-taking incentives in tournaments, while Section 7
extends the comparison between double round robins and AR13’s
round robins.
2. The model
An m-tuple round-robin tournament (or simply tournament)
T (g, n) is a simultaneous n-player game built on an m-player
normal form game g := (M, (Si)i∈M , (ui)i∈M ). We often refer to
g as a match, and we identify each player of g with a role. The set
M = {1, . . . ,m} is the set of roles in the match, where m ≤ n.
Every player plays g against each possible group of m − 1 other
players and in all the possible permutations of the m roles. In
particular, when m = 2, every player plays g with each other
player twice, once in the role of the first player of g (which, using
sports terminology we refer to as the player at home) and once in
the role of the second player of g (or away player). Thus, the total
number of matches in the tournament is given by
(n
m
)
m! = n!(n−m)! ,
that is, the number of possible groups of m players multiplied by
the number of possible permutations of the m roles.
For each i ∈ M , the finite set Si is the set of actions available
to a player who undertakes role i. Every player is assumed to
employ the same action si ∈ Si in all the matches she plays in
role i. The function ui : ∏i∈M Si → R specifies the score that
a player in role i obtains for each action profile in the match.
That is, when she plays si and her opponents play according to
s−i = (s1, . . . , si−1, si+1, . . . , sm) in a match, her score in that
match is ui(si, s−i). A player’s total score is the sum of the scores
that she gets in the (n−1)!(n−m)!m matches she participates in.
9 The
player with the highest total score wins the tournament. In the
case of a tie, the winner is chosen randomly among the set of
top-scoring players. Each player’s objective is to maximize her
probability of winning the tournament.
A pure strategy s in the tournament is a mapping that specifies
for each role iwhich action si to take in the matches played in role
i. The set of pure strategies of each player is S :=∏i∈M Si. That is,
it is the set of pure strategy combinations of the match. A mixed
strategy σ is an element of Σ := ∆(S), the set of probability dis-
tributions on S. Following AR13 we assume global randomization,
that is, mixed strategies are executed only once and the player
9 The number of matches that each player plays is equal to the number
possible groups of m− 1 opponents, (n−1m−1), multiplied by the number of times
she plays with each of those possible groups, m!.
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employs the actions s1, . . . , sm dictated by the resulting pure
strategy in all the matches she plays in role 1, . . . ,m respectively.
Given the structure of the problem, the tournament is a sym-
metric game (even if the match g is usually not) and we focus on
symmetric Nash equilibria in which every player plays the same
mixed strategy. Let P(σ ′, σ ) be the probability that a given player
wins the tournament when she plays the mixed strategy σ ′ and
her n− 1 opponents play σ .
Definition 1. The mixed strategy σ is an equilibrium of the
tournament T (g, n) if
P(σ , σ ) ≥ P(σ ′, σ ) for all σ ′ ∈ Σ .
The setΣ is nonempty, compact, and convex, and the function
P(σ ′, σ ) is linear in σ ′ and continuous in σ , making the associated
best response correspondence convex-valued and upper semi-
continuous. Thus, every tournament has an equilibrium in mixed
strategies. Notice that, if σ is an equilibrium of the tournament,
every action in the support of σ wins with probability 1/n when
all the other n − 1 players play σ . In turn, every action that is
not in the support of σ wins the tournament with probability not
greater than 1/n.
3. The strategies
A player in the tournament interacts m! times with each
group of opponents, playing the match g against them in all the
possible permutations of the roles. In this section we focus on
such an m-player interaction, which allows us to relate strategies
of the tournament and strategy combinations in the game g . This
relationship is crucial as our object of analysis is the base game,
and we want to investigate which of its equilibria are justified as
limit equilibria of tournaments as n increases.
The strategic interaction in which m players play the base
game m! times, simultaneously, and swapping roles in all their
possible permutations can be directly represented by a symmetric
normal form game G. Players have at least two ways of playing
G. One possibility is to choose a probability distribution on S
(i.e., a mixed strategy) whose realization decides which action to
take in all the matches played in each given role. Another, less
general, possibility is to decide these m actions independently
through m probability distributions (that we call ‘‘b-strategy’’),
one on S1, one on S2, and so on, each deciding the action to play
in each possible role. We show below that these two ways of
playing G are equivalent in the sense that a player can generate
the same scores by playing either mixed or b-strategies regardless
of the strategy, and the type of strategy, that the other players are
playing. This implies that a symmetric Nash equilibrium of the
game G is equivalent to a Nash equilibrium of g .10 Otherwise a
player would have an incentive to deviate when playing in some
given role. It also follows that every Nash equilibrium of g can
be transformed into a symmetric Nash equilibrium of G. As we
observe in the next section, this allows us to extend some general
properties of round-robin tournaments derived by AR13 to our
tournaments.
Formally, take a group of m players of the tournament. For
each role i, let Q−i be the set of possible permutations of them−1
roles different from i. Moreover, given a strategy combination
so ∈ Sm−1 of m − 1 opponents, let so−i(q) denote the resulting
combination of actions in the match in which roles different from
i are assigned to those opponents according to q ∈ Q−i. Then,
10 Here, we are identifying a symmetric Nash equilibrium with the
corresponding strategy that is chosen by every player.
given the match g = (M, (Si)i∈M , (ui)i∈M ), we can construct the
m-player symmetric game G := (M, S, u), where
u(s, so) =
∑
i∈M
∑
q∈Q−i
ui(si, so−i(q))
is the score to a player who plays strategy s when her m − 1
opponents play according to so.
The game G summarizes the m! matches played by a group
of m players. Note that each player’s mixed strategy set in G
coincides with the set of mixed strategies available in the tour-
nament. However, our objective is to compare equilibria of the
base game g with equilibria of the tournament. To this end, we
define a b-strategy b = (b1, . . . , bm) as a vector of m probability
distributions, one over each Si. The set of all b-strategies is B :=∏
i∈M ∆(Si). Given a b-strategy b, we define the corresponding
product mixed strategy as the mixed strategy σb ∈ ∆(S) that
satisfies σb(s) =∏i∈M b(si) for every pure strategy s ∈ S. Note that
the set of b-strategies B is the set of mixed strategy combinations
of the base game g . Thus, with slight abuse of notation, we will
sometimes denote a typical strategy combination of g by b and a
typical strategy of a player in the m-player interaction G by σ .
We now prove that mixed and b-strategies are related through
an analogue of Kuhn’s theorem (Kuhn, 1953).11 As a consequence,
every Nash equilibrium of g can be turned into a symmetric Nash
equilibrium of G, and every Nash equilibrium of G can be de-
scribed in terms of a b-strategy profile that is a Nash equilibrium
of g . Let two (mixed or b-) strategies of a player be outcome-
equivalent in the m-player interaction of the tournament if, for
every (mixed or b-) strategy of the opponents, they induce the
same expected score. We will sometimes refer to these strategies
simply as equivalent strategies.
Proposition 1. In the m-player interaction of the tournament,
for every mixed strategy σ ∈ Σ there is an outcome-equivalent
b-strategy b ∈ B, and vice versa. Moreover, given two equivalent
strategies b and σ , if b = (b1, . . . , bm) is a Nash equilibrium of g
then (σ , . . . , σ ) is a Nash equilibrium of G, and vice versa.
Proof. Given the m-player match g and m players of the tourna-
ment, construct the extensive form game E in which a fair move
by Nature determines the roles in which those players are going
to play g . That is, they play g in all the possible permutations
of the m roles, each permutation having probability 1/m!.12 Let
all the decision nodes in which a player plays in the same role
belong to the same information set. Therefore, each player has
m information sets. The set of pure strategies of E coincides
with the set of pure strategies of G and, at each pure strategy
profile, the expected payoff profile in E is equal to 1/m! times the
corresponding payoff profile in G. Moreover, the set of strategy
combinations in g , i.e., the set of b-strategies, coincides with the
set of behavioral strategies of E. Since E has perfect recall, Kuhn’s
theorem directly implies that mixed and behavioral strategies of
E are realization equivalent. Hence, the first statement of the
proposition readily follows.13
Now, let b = (b1, . . . , bm) be a Nash equilibrium of g and
consider the symmetric behavioral strategy combination b∗ =
11 We cannot directly apply Kuhn’s theorem given the lack of perfect recall.
When a player chooses the action to take in the matches she plays in a given
role, she does not know the outcome of the matches she plays in any other
role.
12 For the case in which m = 2, a direct proof of the proposition that does
not rely on the auxiliary game E can be found in the working paper version of
this article. That can be extended to any m > 2.
13 Note that we cannot construct tournaments directly on the game E because
it is the expected payoffs of E that coincide with (a fraction of) the scores
accumulated in the m-player interaction.
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(b, . . . , b) of the extensive form game E. The strategy combination
b∗ is a Nash equilibrium of E, since no player has a profitable
deviation at any of her information sets. It follows that all the
symmetric mixed strategy combinations (σ , . . . , σ ) such that σ
is equivalent to b are Nash equilibria of E and, therefore, of G. On
the other hand, let (σ , . . . , σ ) be a symmetric Nash equilibrium
of G and let the strategy b be equivalent to σ . Then the symmetric
behavioral strategy combination (b, . . . , b) is a Nash equilibrium
of E. Indeed, in E, the expected payoff to a player at the informa-
tion set corresponding to role i and who chooses action si given a
symmetric strategy combination of the opponents is equal to 1/m
times the score that player i obtains in g if she chooses action si
and her opponents choose the actions prescribed by that strategy
combination.14 This implies that b is a Nash equilibrium of g . □
Remark 1. Of course, our symmetrization G is only one of
the possible symmetrizations that could be used.15 Arguably, it
has the advantage of being intuitive and easily interpretable.
Moreover, we can justify its choice by the previous proposition
which allows to directly relate strategies and equilibria of the
base game with strategies and equilibria of the tournament. In
fact, the construction G constitutes a useful link between our
model and AR13’s. In the next section, we prove that some
results in AR13 extend to any m-player symmetric base game.
Since strategies of G and strategies of the tournament coincide,
we can take G as a base game of the tournament and, due to
Proposition 1, express the results for the symmetric game G in
terms of equilibria of the original base game g .
4. The tournament
We can now study the relationship between equilibria of the
game g and equilibria of the tournament built on g . To this effect,
the first step is to understand how strategies in g and strategies
in T (g, n) are related. Recall that a player in the tournament is
restricted to always play the same action in all the matches that
she plays in the same role. Thus, like in the game G, a player
in the tournament can choose to play a mixed strategy or a b-
strategy (i.e. a mixed strategy with a product structure over S).
But contrary to the game G, once we fix the behavior of the
opponents, a mixed strategy in the tournament may not have a
corresponding b-strategy that generates the same probability of
winning the tournament even if it generates the same expected
score. Furthermore, given a b-strategy b, there may be more
than one mixed strategy that is equivalent to b in the m-player
interaction. In the tournament, these mixed strategies may also
generate different winning probabilities. We illustrate these facts
in the following example.
Example 1. Consider the double round-robin tournament with
two players built on the following game g:
14 In the expensive game E, each player plays in a given role with probability
1/m, that is, the probability of each interaction played in that role 1/m!
multiplied by the number of these interactions (m− 1)!.
15 For example, a standard symmetrization of an m× n bimatrix game (A, B)
where, without loss of generality, A and B are the non-negative (and with no
zero column) payoff matrices of the two players, is given by the (m+n)×(m+n)
game (C, C⊤) with C =
(
0 A
B⊤ 0
)
(where M⊤ is the transpose of matrix M).
Savani and von Stengel (2016, Proposition 2) prove that there exists a one-to-
one correspondence between equilibria of the bimatrix game and symmetric
equilibria of such a symmetrization. However, this correspondence does not
extend to all strategies (more precisely, to their strategy combinations and
strategies, respectively).
The corresponding two-player symmetric game G capturing the
two-player interaction is (only payoffs to the first player are
shown):
Since there are only two players in the tournament we can easily
represent the 4 × 4 matrix with the probabilities of winning for
each strategy profile (only the probability of winning of the first
player is shown):
The match g has a unique Nash equilibrium that generates the
b-strategy b = ( 13A+ 23B, 13C + 23D). We write such a b-strategy
as the product mixed strategy σb = 19AC+ 29AD+ 29BC+ 49BD. The
non-product strategy σ = 13AC+ 23BD is also outcome-equivalent
to b in G. Proposition 1 implies that both (σb, σb) and (σ , σ ) are
Nash equilibria of G. But those two strategies are not equivalent in
the tournament. For instance, σb wins against AC with probability
13
18 , while σ wins against the same action with probability
5
6 .
Furthermore, this tournament does not have an equilibrium in
b-strategies. This can be directly seen by checking that the unique
equilibrium of the tournament is σ ∗ = 13AD + 13BC + 13BD. But
it is also illustrative to argue why in this example there cannot
be an equilibrium in b-strategies. First, the tournament does not
have any pure strategy equilibrium and, hence, an equilibrium in
pure b-strategies does not exist. Moreover, there is no equilibrium
in completely-mixed strategies because AC is weakly dominated
by AD in the tournament. That is, there is no equilibrium in
b-strategies where players completely mix between A and B at
home and C and D away. For the same reason, the tournament
does not have an equilibrium with support {AC, AD}, so there is
no equilibrium in b-strategies where players play A at home with
probability one. Finally, no other equilibrium in b-strategies exists
where players only randomize either at home or away because
there is no equilibrium of the tournament with support {BC, BD},
{AC, BC}, or {AD, BD}.
Thus, we cannot define a tournament by restricting players to
play the lower-dimensional set of b-strategies B if we want to
preserve existence of equilibria.16 This is one justification why,
as outlined in Section 2, the strategy set must be the full dimen-
sional set of mixed strategies. Proposition 1 gives us the proper
tool to relate equilibria of the tournament T (g, n) to equilibria of
the base game g .
In particular, we relate the equilibria of a game to the limit
equilibria of tournaments based on it in the following proposition,
which establishes an analogous result to Proposition 1 in AR13.
The limit of a sequence of equilibria of tournaments as n goes
to infinity is an equilibrium of the base game. First, we general-
ize AR13’s proof to tournaments built on any m-player symmetric
game, where every player meets each group of m− 1 opponents
to play the base game once. Second, we can consider G to be such
16 Let P(b′, b) be the probability that a player playing b′ wins the tournament
when her opponents play according to b (i.e., it is defined analogously to
P(σ ′, σ )). The set B is nonempty, compact, and convex. However, the function
P(b′, b) is continuous in b but not quasi-concave in b′ . The resulting non-
convexity of the best response correspondence is the reason why Nash equilibria
in b-strategies may not exist.
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a base game and use Proposition 1 to translate equilibria of G in
terms of equilibria of g .17
Proposition 2. Let σ be the limit point of a sequence of equilibria
of T (g, n) as n goes to infinity. Then σ is a (symmetric) Nash
equilibrium of G and the equivalent b-strategy b = (b1, . . . , bm) is
a Nash equilibrium of g.
Proof. First, consider an m-player symmetric game G˜ and the
n-player tournament R˜(G˜, n) in which every player meets simulta-
neously each group of m−1 opponents once, and in every match
the game G˜ is played. AR13 (Proposition 1) prove that, if G˜ is a
two-player game, any strategy profile that is the limit point of
some sequence of equilibria of R˜(G˜, n) as n goes to infinity is a
symmetric equilibrium of G˜. We now generalize their proof to
every m > 2.
To this end, fix a player and let σ o be a symmetric strat-
egy combination of the opponents, let so ∈ Sm−1 be a pure
strategy combination of m − 1 opponents and let σ o(so) be the
probability that σ o attaches to it. For every pure strategy s ∈
S, we denote with u(s, σ o) the random variable that receives
value u(s, so) with probability σ o(so). Then we have Eu(s, σ o) =∑
so∈Sm−1 σ
o(so)u(s, so). Now, let σ ∗ be the limit of a sequence {σn}
of equilibria of R˜(G˜, n) as n goes to infinity. Following AR13, we
first show that every strategy in the support of σ ∗ must induce
the same expected score in G˜.
Assume to the contrary that s and s′ are pure strategies in the
support of σ ∗ such that Eu(s′, σ ∗) > Eu(s, σ ∗). For n sufficiently
large, we have Eu(s′, σn) > Eu(s, σn) + K for some K > 0. Let
N0 =
(n−1
m−1
)
be the total number of matches that a player plays in
the tournament, N1 =
(n−2
m−2
)
be the number of matches in which
she meets a given opponent, and N2 = N0−N1 be the number of
matches in which she does not meet that opponent. Whenm > 2,
the scores that two players using s and s′ obtain when they meet
each other are random variables because there are other players
in the same match whose behavior is decided by the realization
of a mixed strategy. Therefore, when players play according to
strategy σn, the player who plays s attains as high a score as the
player who plays s′ if
N2∑
k=1
u(s, σ kn )+
N1∑
j=1
u(s, (s′, σ jn)) ≥
N2∑
k=1
u(s′, σ kn )+
N1∑
j=1
u(s′, (s, σ jn)), (1)
where σ kn and σ
j
n are copies of the R˜(G˜, n) equilibrium strategy σn,
and u(s, (s′, σn)) is the (random) score that a player who chooses
s gets in a match when one opponent chooses s′ and all the others
play according to σn (similarly for u(s′, (s, σn))). We can write the
above condition as
N2∑
k=1
u(s, σ kn )−
N2∑
k=1
u(s′, σ kn )− N2
[
Eu(s, σn)− Eu(s′, σn)
] ≥
N1∑
j=1
u(s′, (s, σ jn))−
N1∑
j=1
u(s, (s′, σ jn))+ N2
[
Eu(s′, σn)− Eu(s, σn)
]
.
Let ¯¯u = maxso u(s, (s′, so)) and u¯ = minso u(s′, (s, so)) where
so ∈ Sm−2. We can show that the probability of the event
N2∑
k=1
u(s, σ kn )−
N2∑
k=1
u(s′, σ kn )− N2
[
Eu(s, σn)− Eu(s′, σn)
]
≥ N1(u¯− ¯¯u)+ N2K (2)
17 Note that AR13’s proof can be directly extended if m = 2, as in this case
G is a symmetric two-player game.
is of order 1/n, which implies that for n sufficiently large the
probability of (1) is of order 1/n.
For n large enough, the right hand side of (2) is positive inde-
pendently of the sign of u¯− ¯¯u because N2 is of order nm−1 while
N1 is of order nm−2. Thus, condition (2) is satisfied whenever the
sum of random variables
∑N2
k=1
[
u(s, σ kn )− u(s′, σ kn )
]
exceeds its
expectation N2
[
Eu(s, σn)− Eu(s′, σn)
]
by N1Ln+N2K > 0, where
Ln = u¯ − ¯¯u. Differently from the case m = 2 (cf. AR13) when
m > 2 a player meets the same opponents in several matches.
Since mixed strategies are executed only once, the random vari-
ables in the sum are not independent.18 These random variables
have the same variance, that we denote Vn, which converges to
the variance of u(s, σ ∗) − u(s′, σ ∗). Recall that the covariance
between two random variables is smaller than or equal to the
highest of their variances. Finally, note that the (double of the)
number of couples of dependent random variables is smaller
than N3 = N2(m − 1)
(n−3
m−2
)
.19 It follows that the variance of∑N2
k=1
[
u(s, σ kn )− u(s′, σ kn )
]
is smaller than N2Vn + N3Vn, being
N3Vn an upper bound of the covariances. Using Chebyshev’s in-
equality, we obtain that the probability of the event (2) is smaller
than N2Vn+N3Vn
(N1Ln+N2K )2 . Since N3 is of order n
2m−3 while N22 is of order
n2m−2, such a fraction is of order 1/n.
Chernoff’s inequality implies that with probability that rapidly
approaches 1 there are at least σ
∗(s)
2 n players who end up playing
s. Hence, for sufficiently large n, the probability that a player who
plays strategy s wins the tournament is smaller than c/n2 for
some c > 0. We conclude that all the strategies in the support
of σ ∗ must induce the same expected score in G˜ for σ ∗ to be the
limit of equilibria of tournaments R˜(G˜, n) as n goes to infinity.
Suppose now that the pure strategy s′′ is not in the support
of σ ∗ and satisfies Eu(s′′, σ ∗) > Eu(s, σ ∗) for every s in the
support of σ ∗. In this case, the argument above implies that the
probability that a strategy s in the support of σ ∗ attains as high a
score as s′′ in R˜(G˜, n) is smaller than cs/n for some cs > 0. Hence,
letting c∗ be the maximum of these values, the probability that a
player playing s′′ wins the tournament when her n−1 opponents
play according to σn is greater than
(
1− c∗n
)#S , which is greater
than 1/n for n sufficiently large (see also AR13).
We can therefore conclude that, given an m-player symmetric
game G˜, every limit of subsequence of equilibria of R˜(G˜, n) as n
goes to infinity is a symmetric equilibrium of G˜. Now, consider
an m-player game g and the corresponding symmetric game G
representing the m-player interaction in T (g, n). It is easy to
see that the tournament T (g, n) based on g coincides with the
tournament R˜(G, n) based on G. It follows that, if σ ∗ is the limit
point of a sequence of equilibria of T (g, n) as n goes to infinity,
then σ ∗ is a symmetric Nash equilibrium of G. By Proposition 1,
the b-strategy equivalent to σ ∗ is a Nash equilibrium of g . □
Proposition 2 tells us that the set of limit points of equilibria
of tournaments as n goes to infinity is a subset of the Nash
equilibrium set of the base game. Proposition 3 shows that this is
a strict subset of equilibria.
Proposition 3. Let b = (b1, . . . , bm) be a Nash equilibrium of g
and let Σ(b) be the set of all mixed strategies that are equivalent
18 In fact, any two random variables u(s, σ kn )−u(s′, σ kn ) and u(s, σ k′n )−u(s′, σ k′n )
corresponding to two matches in which at least one opponent is the same are
dependent, while any two random variables corresponding to two matches in
which no opponent is the same are independent.
19 N2 =
(n−2
m−1
)
is the total number of matches that a player plays with n− 2
opponents. The number of these matches with the same given opponent is
(n−3
m−2
)
,
and the number of possible opponents in the match is m − 1. Note that in N3
every couple of dependent random variables is counted twice.
F. De Sinopoli, C. Meroni and C. Pimienta / Journal of Mathematical Economics 86 (2020) 41–51 47
to b. The set Σ(b) does not necessarily contain a limit point of a
sequence of equilibria of T (g, n) as n goes to infinity.
Proof. The ultimatum game presented in Example 3 has a Nash
equilibrium in which the first player proposes an unfair offer
and the second player accepts both fair and unfair offers. Such
a strategy is not a limit point of a sequence of equilibria of
tournaments as the number of players increases.20 □
A Nash equilibrium b of g typically generates a set Σ(b) of
mixed strategies that are equivalent to b in the m-player inter-
action. We now show that if a mixed strategy σ ∈ Σ(b) is the
limit point of a sequence of equilibria of tournaments as n goes
to infinity then it is not necessarily the case that all the strategies
in Σ(b) can be sustained in a similar way.
Example 2. Consider the double round-robin tournament based
on the following game g:
whose corresponding two-player symmetric game G is:
The game g has a unique Nash equilibrium, b = ( 12A+ 12B, 12C+
1
2D
)
. Proposition 2 implies that at least one mixed strategy equiv-
alent to b is a limit point of a sequence of equilibria of D(g, n) as
n goes to infinity. Indeed, we can see that the symmetries of the
induced two-player interaction G imply that σ ∗ = 14AC + 14AD+
1
4BC + 14BD is an equilibrium of the tournament for every n and,
consequently, also a limit point as n goes to infinity.
But take the equivalent mixed strategy σ = 12AC + 12BD and a
sufficiently large number of players n. If the other n − 1 players
play according to σ , strategy 12AC+ 12BD accumulates a score equal
to zero and wins the tournament with probability 1/n. In turn,
strategy AD’s accumulated score is equal to the number of players
who end up playing BD minus the number of players who end up
playing AC . Such a score is strictly greater than 1 with probability
close to 1/2, while every other player’s highest possible score is
1. Hence, a player who deviates to AD also wins the tournament
with probability close to 1/2. An analogous reasoning is true for a
deviation to strategy BC . It follows that σ is never an equilibrium
of D(g, n) for large n, and it is not even a limit point of equilibria
of tournaments as n goes to infinity. In fact, since the probability
of winning is continuous in the strategies of the opponents, the
above argument implies that, for every σ˜ ∈ Σ and ε small
enough, strategy (1 − ε)σ + εσ˜ is not an equilibrium of the
tournament with sufficiently large n.
5. Tournament-stability
Propositions 2 and 3 suggest a refinement criterion, which
selects the Nash equilibria of a game that can be approximated
by equilibria of tournaments built on it as the number of players
increases. We call the equilibria that satisfy such a property
tournament-stable equilibria. A tournament-stable equilibrium al-
ways exists. Indeed, every tournament has an equilibrium, so
20 Alternatively, one can consider the double round-robin tournament built
on the ‘‘degenerate’’ game used to prove Proposition 2 in AR13. Note that such
proposition cannot be directly extended to our framework, given our constraints
on G.
for any sequence of tournaments T (g, n) as n goes to infinity
we can construct an associated sequence of equilibria. Such a
sequence is contained in the compact set Σ , hence it has a subse-
quence that converges. Thus, every game has a tournament-stable
equilibrium.
Then, it seems natural to compare the solution concept of
tournament-stable equilibrium with other concepts offered by
the literature on equilibrium refinements, which have been in-
troduced in order to capture some rationality principles. The
next proposition shows that tournament-stability is satisfied by
strict equilibria that, whenever they exist, satisfy all the nice
properties one can hope for. A strict equilibrium is robust to
various perturbations in the nature of the game and it is also
robust to the current tournament specification.
Proposition 4. Let b = (b1, . . . , bm) be a strict Nash equilibrium
of g, and let s be its corresponding equivalent strategy. There exists
an integer n¯ such that s is an equilibrium of the tournament T (g, n)
for every n ≥ n¯.
Proof. A Nash equilibrium is strict if every deviation implies a
strict loss. If b is a strict equilibrium in g then its equivalent strat-
egy s is a strict equilibrium in G. With slight abuse of terminology,
let s denote also the strategy combination of the opponents in
which everybody chooses s, and let (s′, s) denote the strategy
combination in which one opponent chooses s′ and all the others
choose s. Denote with k = mins′ ̸=s u(s, s) − u(s′, s) > 0 the
minimum loss that a player incurs in any m-player interaction
if she deviates from s, and with k¯ = maxs′ ̸=s u(s, s) − u(s, (s′, s))
the maximum loss (or the minimum gain) of the opponents that
she can induce by deviating. Since a player in the tournament
participates in
(n−1
m−1
)
m-player interactions (summarized by the
symmetric game G) and every opponent meets her
(n−2
m−2
)
times,
a player does not have incentive to deviate from s if
(n−1
m−1
)
k ≥(n−2
m−2
)
k¯. That is, if n ≥ k¯(m−1)+kk . Letting n¯ be the smallest integer
greater than or equal to this fraction, the result follows. □
Not surprisingly, the set of strict equilibria is a strict subset of
the set of tournament-stable equilibria. Nonetheless, tournament-
stable equilibria may exclude strategy combinations that are
strategically stable. Indeed, in the following example tournament-
stability eliminates an equilibrium that is strictly perfect, hence,
also perfect and a Kohlberg and Mertens (1986)’s stable set.
Moreover, such an equilibrium is also proper and a Mertens
(1989)’s stable set. That is, tournament-stability may not select an
equilibrium that satisfies the most prominent concepts proposed
by the equilibrium refinement literature.
Example 3 (The Ultimatum Game). Consider the double round-
robin tournament whose match g coincides with the ‘‘ultimatum
game’’. The player playing at home can offer a fair (F ) or unfair
(U) proposal about how to split 10 dollars, and the player playing
away can either accept (A) or reject (R) it. The utility for a player
to have x dollars is given by x.
Hence, the match g is the normal form game:
Strategy FRA – make a fair proposal and accept a proposal if and
only if it is fair – is an equilibrium of the tournament for every
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n, and the equivalent b-strategy (F , RA) is an undominated Nash
equilibrium of g . On the other hand, the b-strategy (U, AA) –
make an unfair proposal and accept both fair and unfair proposals
– is a strictly perfect equilibrium of g and, therefore, a stable
set as defined by Kohlberg and Mertens (1986). It also satisfies
the stronger stability definition proposed by Mertens (1989).
The equivalent strategy UAA, however, is not an equilibrium of
the tournament for any n, and neither is any close-by strategy.
Indeed, in the matches in which a player plays away, she has the
incentive to deviate and reject the unfair offer to inflict a loss
of 10 to her opponents. Hence, if everybody conforms to UAA,
a player can increase her probability of winning from 1/n to 1
by deviating to URA. Therefore strategy UAA cannot not even be
approached by a limit point of equilibria of tournaments as the
number of players increases. It follows that a stable set does not
necessarily contain an equilibrium of the tournament T (g, n) for
any n, and not even a limit point of a sequence of equilibria as n
goes to infinity.
Note that, in this version of the ultimatum game, rejecting an
unfair proposal is costless because it does not have any effect on
the total score of the player doing it. It also inflicts a loss to the
other player. We now modify the ultimatum game used as the
match of the tournament so that a player can offer a ‘‘somewhat
unfair’’ proposal that is costly to reject because it entails giving up
the small split that is offered. Suppose that the player playing at
home can additionally make an intermediate offer (M) that gives
some amount z to the player playing away, with 0 < z < 5:
As before, offering the fair proposal and accepting a proposal only
if it is fair is an equilibrium of the tournament for every n and
every z. Likewise, the tournament has no equilibrium in which
players accept the unfair proposal U . Now, however, accepting
the intermediate offer M can be part of an equilibrium strategy of
the tournament, but only if the number of players is sufficiently
large. Indeed, for each z, strategy MAA is an equilibrium of the
tournament D(g(z), n) if and only if n ≥ nz =
⌈ 10
z
⌉
. Note that
limz→0 nz = ∞, so arbitrarily unfair proposals can be sustained
in equilibrium provided the size of the population is large enough.
Even if, in this example, tournament-stability seems to be
extremely restrictive, it may also allow for equilibria that are not
strategically stable. In the following example we show that every
dominated equilibrium of the base game is an equilibrium of the
tournament for large enough n.
Example 4 (The Entry Game). Consider the classical ‘‘entry game’’,
in which Firm 1 decides whether or not to enter the market, and
Firm 2 decides how to compete, either aggressively (Fight) or not
(Accommodate). Specifically, let the extensive form representa-
tion of the game be:
whose corresponding normal form representation of the match g
is:
The match g has an undominated Nash equilibrium (E, A) which
is subgame perfect in the extensive form representation. The
equivalent strategy EA is an equilibrium of the tournament D(g, n)
for every n ≥ 3. But g also has a continuum of dominated Nash
equilibria,
E∗ ≡
{
(N, αF + (1− α)A) : 1
2
≤ α ≤ 1
}
.
Of course, equilibria in E∗ are not subgame perfect equilibria
because Firm 2 is making a non-credible threat about its intention
to fight if Firm 1 enters the market. However, in the tournament
D(g, n), strategy NF – not entering the market under the threat
of a fight – is an equilibrium when n ≥ 4.
Let us now analyze strategies in the continuum E∗ and how
they can be sustained as equilibria of the tournament. Under the
mixed strategy αNF + (1 − α)NA, where 12 ≤ α ≤ 1, the only
potential profitable deviation to consider is playing E instead of
N when in the role of the first firm. Thus, for a given α, consider
a player who plays E when in the role of Firm 1 while all the
other players play strategy αNF + (1 − α)NA (clearly, in this
case, strategies EF and EA attain the same score and the same
probability of winning). Let x be the number of players that play
NF in equilibrium. The player who plays E accumulates a score of
n − 1 − 2x at home and a score of 2(n − 1) away for a total of
3n−3−2x. In turn, players who play NA accumulate 2(n−2)+1
and players who play NF accumulate 2(n − 2) − 1, so a player
who ends up playing NF does not win the tournament if there
is at least one player who plays NA. Thus, playing E when in the
role of the first firm is a profitable deviation if and only if
P
(
x = n
2
) 1
n− x + P
(
x <
n
2
)
>
1
n
, (3)
where
P
(
x = n
2
)
=
(
n− 1
n/2
)
αn/2(1− α)n−1−n/2
is positive only if n is an even number and, letting m = ⌈ n2⌉,
P
(
x <
n
2
)
=
∑
k=0,...,m−1
(
n− 1
k
)
αk(1− α)n−1−k.
When α = 12 , E is always a profitable deviation, so strategy
1
2NF + 12NA is never an equilibrium of the tournament for any
n. For a fixed n > 4, the left hand side of (3) is decreasing in
α and equals the right hand side at some value α∗n ∈
( 1
2 , 1
)
. It
follows that, for every n > 4,
{
αNF + (1− α)NA : α∗n ≤ α ≤ 1
}
is
a continuum of equilibria of the tournament D(g, n). In particular,
α∗n is decreasing in n and approaches
1
2 as n grows to infinity.
We conclude that all the strategies in the continuum, including
1
2NF + 12NA, are limit points of equilibria of tournaments as n
goes to infinity. That is, even if each dominated equilibrium is
a ‘‘non-credible threat’’ in the match, such threats are rendered
plausible in the tournament provided the number of interactions
is sufficiently high.
Thus, apart from selecting a strict equilibrium when it exists,
there is no other systematic relationship between tournament-
stability and traditional equilibrium refinements. As mentioned
by AR13, the refinement criterion provided by tournaments may
be more appropriate to an evolutionary interpretation of equilib-
rium. To this end and in their same vein, in the next section we
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examine the intuition that tournaments encourage risky behavior,
using a very natural setting in which tournaments prove very
useful to refine the Nash equilibrium set.
6. Taking risks
In the same spirit as AR13, Section 5, we now explore the
intuition that tournaments encourage risk-taking behavior. Our
construction allows us to study such an intuition using a different
avenue. We analyze a two-player game with a continuum of equi-
libria that induce a continuum of different risk levels associated
to the choice of one of the players, and we show that the unique
tournament-stable equilibrium is the riskiest one, thus suggesting
a very useful refinement criterion. In contrast, AR13 consider a
2 × 2 symmetric game that has a unique symmetric equilibrium
in which players randomize between a risky and a safe action,
and they examine how this equilibrium is approached in tourna-
ments as the number of players increase; that is, how often the
risky action is chosen in the equilibrium of the tournament with
respect to the equilibrium of the base game. Note that in this case
the probabilities with which an individual chooses the risky and
the safe actions are those that balance the equilibrium payoffs of
the opponents, and in this sense they depend on the incentives
of the others. Arguably, the current approach has the advantage
to make individual incentives more explicit, as the equilibrium
associated with the riskiest behavior is precisely the only one that
survives. Moreover, these incentives are unambiguously driven
by the tournament structure, i.e., by the fact that the prize is
allocated to the player who accumulates the highest score. To
highlight this, we briefly consider different tournament incentives
and assume that players play to minimize the probability of at-
taining the lowest score. Under this revised tournament structure,
the only equilibrium that survives is the one associated with the
safest behavior.
Consider a two-player match where the player playing at
home can either take an outside option or play a constant sum
game against the other player. Scores have been chosen so that
the outside option gives a score equal to the value of the constant
sum game for the home player. In this sense, the outside option is
the safe action (S) while choosing to play the constant sum game
is the risky action (R).
The match g is therefore:
The set of Nash equilibria of g consists of the continuum of
strategy profiles{(
(1− 2x)S + xRH + xRT , 1
2
H + 1
2
T
)
: 0 ≤ x ≤ 1
2
}
.
In every equilibrium point, player 1 randomizes between the safe
outside option S and entering the subgame playing its equilibrium
strategy 12H + 12T . Of course, player 2 responds with its corre-
sponding equilibrium strategy 12H + 12T . Every strategy profile in
the one-dimensional set of equilibria induces the same expected
scores and, moreover, the set of equilibria can be ordered in terms
of second order stochastic dominance, from the one giving the
least risky returns to the first player (x = 0) to the one giving her
the riskiest returns (x = 1/2). We can show that, in the associated
tournament, only this last equilibrium survives as the number of
players increases.
Indeed, Proposition 2 implies that, for large enough n, every
player plays close to 12H + 12T when playing away. If all players
play S at home then they all attain the same score and win with
probability 1/n. But when a player deviates to, e.g., RH at home
she obtains the highest score whenever more players end up
playing H than T when playing away. And that event happens
with probability close to 1/2. A similar argument goes through
for every equilibrium of g in which the first player plays the safe
action with positive probability.
It is revealing to briefly consider a tournament structure built
on g that generates more ‘‘conservative’’ incentives, and to exam-
ine how that affects the players’ risk-taking behavior in equilib-
rium. To this effect, suppose that players’ objective is not anymore
to maximize the probability of being the highest scorer in the
tournament but to minimize the probability of being the lowest
scorer. If several players obtain the lowest score, the loser is
selected at random. One can prove that the analogous version of
Proposition 2 also holds with this tournament structure. That is,
any limit point of equilibria of tournaments as n goes to infinity is
a Nash equilibrium of g . This implies that, for large enough n and
in equilibrium, every player plays a strategy close to 12H + 12T in
the matches away. Suppose that players play a strategy close to
1
2RH + 12RT when playing at home. Under such a strategy profile,
any given action is the lowest scorer with probability close to 1/4.
For example, playing RH at home and H away accumulates the
lowest score if more players end up playing T than H away and
also more players end up playing RH than RT at home.
Now, consider a player who deviates to the safe action S at
home. Define a configuration µ to be a possible realization in the
tournament of the mixed strategy profile indicated above and, for
any action at home and away A, let µ(A) be the number of players
who choose it. The score accumulated by the deviating player is
(n− 1)+
{
2µ(RH) if she ends up playing T
2µ(RT ) if she ends up playing H.
(4)
In turn, the score accumulated by each of the other possible
actions is
(RH,H) : 2(µ(H)− 1)+ 2µ(RT )+ 1 = 2µ(H)+ 2µ(RT )− 1
(RH, T ) : 2µ(H)+ 2(µ(RH)− 1)+ 1 = 2µ(H)+ 2µ(RH)− 1
(RT ,H) : 2µ(T )+ 2(µ(RT )− 1)+ 1 = 2µ(T )+ 2µ(RT )− 1
(RT , T ) : 2(µ(T )− 1)+ 2µ(RH)+ 1 = 2µ(T )+ 2µ(RH)− 1.
Note that the probability that at least one player plays each of
these actions rapidly approaches 1 as n increases. Suppose that
the configuration µ is such that µ(T ) ≤ µ(H). Then, the lowest
score among the non-deviating players is obtained by those who
end up playing either (RT ,H) or (RT , T ). If additionally µ(RT ) ≤
µ(RH) then the lowest score in the tournament is less than or
equal to (n− 1)+ 2µ(RT )− 1, which is strictly smaller than the
score accumulated by the deviating player computed in Eq. (4)
regardless of the action that she plays away. An analogous rea-
soning goes through if µ(RT ) ≥ µ(RH) or µ(T ) ≥ µ(H). Thus, we
conclude that deviating to the safe action S at home is a profitable
deviation in the tournament whenever players play 12RH + 12RT
at home and 12H + 12T away. A similar argument works for every
strategy in the continuum of Nash equilibria of the match g
such that x > 0. Therefore, in the unique Nash equilibrium of the
match that is a limit point of equilibria of tournaments as n goes
to infinity, players play the safe action at home.
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7. (Double) round-robin tournaments
It is evident from the above applications that our construction
extends the scope of AR13’s analysis from two-player symmetric
games to a very broad range of games. Moreover, it allows us to
examine also non-symmetric equilibria of symmetric games. We
conclude studying some two-player symmetric games, for which
we can compare the results obtained with our double round-
robin tournaments and those obtained with AR13’s round robins.
From such a study it emerges that the extension of AR13’s results
to our setting is not immediate but requires careful study.
Consider first the coordination game g:
AR13 (Proposition 4) prove that equilibria of g and equilibria of
the round-robin tournament built on g coincide for any number
of players. Hence, the strategy profile in which every player ran-
domizes equally between playing A in every match and playing
B in every match is an equilibrium of the tournament for every
n. Now, consider the double round-robin tournament based on g ,
whose two-player interaction is summarized by the game
and take the strategy profile in which, in the same vein as before,
every player randomizes equally between playing A in every
match and playing B in every match, i.e. plays strategy σ =
1
2AA + 12BB. Then, assume that the total number of players is
odd and consider a player who contemplates the configuration in
which half of her opponents end up playing AA and the other half
end up playing BB. Under this configuration, strategy AB attains
the same score that AA and BB would do if the player chose them;
but it decreases the score that AA and BB obtain by 1. Since in this
case AB wins with probability 1 and the probability of such a real-
ization is larger than 1/n (because such a realization is the mode
of the binomial B(n− 1, p), whose associated probability is larger
than 1/(n− 1) > 1/n), it follows that AB is a profitable deviation
and, hence, σ is not an equilibrium of the tournament.21
Now, let us just relabel the actions of one of the players in g
so that we obtain the strategically equivalent symmetric game g ′:
First, note that building a double round-robin tournament on
g ′ allows us to study also the non-symmetric equilibria (A, B)
and (B, A) which are excluded in AR13’s analysis.22 In particular,
it directly follows from the result in Proposition 4 that their
equivalent strategies AB and BA are symmetric Nash equilibria
of D(g ′, n) for every n sufficiently large. Then, note that g ′ has
a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium, b = ( 12A+ 12B, 12A+ 12B),
which is the unique equilibrium of the corresponding round-
robin tournament R(g ′, n) for every n (see AR13, p.40). But, in
this case, the strategy in which every player randomizes equally
between playing A in every match and playing B in every match
is also an equilibrium of the double round robin based on g ′. In
fact, we can show that, for every n large enough, when players
21 In turn, one can show that σ is an equilibrium of the tournament when
the number of players is even.
22 See also footnote 7.
play according to σ = 12AA+ 12BB there is no profitable deviation
neither to action AB nor to action BA, and this is enough to
conclude that σ is an equilibrium of D(g ′, n) because b is an
equilibrium of R(g ′, n).
Indeed, given the two-player interaction G′
it is easy to see that the symmetric game obtained from G′ after
eliminating actions AB and BA is an affine transformation of g ′.
Therefore, no player has an incentive to deviate to either AA or
BB in D(g ′, n). Moreover, actions AB and BA are equivalent given
σ , so that it is enough to examine the incentives to deviate to AB.
Action AB attains the maximum score only when every opponent
chooses AA or when every opponent chooses BB, winning in both
cases with probability 1. That is, when x opponents play AA and
n − x − 1 opponents play BB, the player who plays AB obtains
a score equal to n − 1, while players playing AA and BB obtain,
respectively, 2n − 2x − 1 and 2x + 1, so AB never wins the
tournament. It follows that, when players play according to σ ,
AB wins the tournament with probability (1/2)n−1 + (1/2)n−1.
Consider now the winning probability of, e.g., AA. It wins with
probability 1/n when every opponent plays AA, with probability
1 when every opponent plays BB, and with probability 1/(x+ 1)
(resp. 1/n) when x opponents play AA, n−x−1 opponents play BB
and x < n2−1 (resp. x = n2−1). For n large enough, the probability
that AA wins the tournament when players play according to σ
is therefore greater than(
1
2
)n−1
+ 1
2
P(x = 1) =
(
1
2
)n−1
+ 1
2
1
2
(
1
2
)n−2
(n− 1)
=
(
1
2
)n−1
+ n− 1
2
(
1
2
)n−1
,
which is greater than the probability of winning of AB. We con-
clude that, contrary to the case in which the base game was g ,
now σ is supported as equilibrium of every double round-robin
tournament in which the number of players is sufficiently large.23
23 The results of AR13 also remain valid with our construction for the unique
symmetric equilibrium of the ‘‘game of chicken’’ g:
A B
A 0, 0 −1, 1
B 1,−1 −10,−10
Strategy b = ( 910A+ 110 B, 910A+ 110 B) is the limit point of a sequence of
equilibria of round-robin tournaments as n goes to infinity and, analogously,
the equivalent strategy σ = ( 910AA+ 110 BB) is the limit point of a sequence of
equilibria of double round-robin tournaments. To see this we take, for every
n, the unique symmetric equilibrium αnA + (1 − αn)B of R(g, n) and construct
strategy σn = αnAA + (1 − αn)BB. Then we check whether there are profitable
deviations in D(g, n) from σn to either AB or BA. As before, both of these
tournament strategies win with probability 1 under the configurations in which
either all the opponents end up playing AA or all the opponents end up playing
BB. Namely, they both win with probability αn−1n +(1−αn)n−1 . On the other hand,
action BB wins with probability 1 when every other player plays AA and with
probability 1/2 when only one other player plays BB (it also wins under other
configurations but we can neglect them here). That is, it wins with probability
greater than αn−1n + n−12 αn−2n (1− αn). Since αn > 1/2 (see AR13, Proposition 6),
we can conclude that σn is an equilibrium also for D(g, n) and, therefore, σ is
justified as a limit equilibrium also with double round-robin tournaments. Note
again that, under our construction, the strict non-symmetric Nash equilibria of
g play a role too as they are sustained as equilibria of tournaments with a
sufficiently large number of players.
The same reasoning and the same results can be easily extended to general
2 × 2 anti-coordination games.
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